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“DATA, VIEWS, OR ARGUMENTS”: A RUMINATION
Michael Herz*
[T]he agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to partici-
pate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views,
or arguments . . . .
—5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
INTRODUCTION—THE PARABLE OF THE HONEYBEES
In 1989 Charles Koch gave a short paper at the Annual Symposium of the Institute
of Bill of Rights Law, which that year was, of course, devoted to the bicentennial of
the Bill of Rights. Charles’s paper was entitled Cooperative Surplus: The Efficiency
Justification for Active Government.1 It was a brief comment (actually more of an
assault) on Richard Epstein.2
“Cooperative surplus” is an economist’s term; it refers to the additional benefits
that can be created when individuals cooperate instead of compete.3 Think of the
prisoner’s dilemma. Charles’s basic point was that government exists to create, and then
fairly to distribute, a cooperative surplus.4 That is a very happy view. I think it is basi-
cally right, at least in theory. To be sure, government feels coercive, and people are
naturally more focused on what it takes than on what it gives. But at bottom it is a
mechanism of cooperation and mutual agreement, one that is (or can be) at least Kaldor-
Hicks efficient.5
I mention this article for three reasons.
First, it is a reminder that as administrative lawyers, often absorbed in the grubby
details, we should look to the big picture from time to time. And this is a very happy
account of the big picture.
Second, while Charles focuses on substantive principles, he does make a passing
reference to procedure, noting that in light of this conception of government’s basic
* Arthur Kaplan Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Many
thanks to Rick Bierschbach and Nina Mendelson for comments on an earlier draft and to
Candace Chung and Tim White for helpful research.
1 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Cooperative Surplus: The Efficiency Justification for Active
Government, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 431 (1990).
2 Id. at 431.
3 Id. at 434–35.
4 Id. at 435.
5 For a discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and its relation to governmental functions, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990).
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function, “the Constitution requires that we take or allocate surplus through a certain
type of decisionmaking: a republican form and due process.”6 That is, legislative policy-
making requires a republican form of government;7 adjudication must be conducted
with due process.8 Agency rulemaking—the administrative counterpart to legislation—
is not directly subject to either of these constitutional commands. However, it can be
seen as a small-r republican undertaking.9 In this Article, I will address certain small-r
republican aspects of rulemaking—ways in which it is or is not about open debate and
popular input.
And third, Charles mentions bees. This may not seem important. But I want to talk
about honeybees and need a hook. Here is the bees reference: “Active government is
necessary to create the cooperative surplus on which we all thrive. Because man lacks
the altruistic instincts of bees and ants, we can only achieve the cooperative surplus by
accepting compelled cooperation. In a complicated society, government necessarily per-
forms this function.”10
Charles thought that bees and human beings were too different for the first to be
any sort of model for the second. I am ultimately going to agree. But not everyone does.
One person who does not is Thomas Seeley, a professor of biology at Cornell Univer-
sity and one of the world’s leading experts on honeybees. For many years, he has re-
searched how wild honeybees go about picking sites for new hives after a swarm has
left its old home. In 2010 he published a book for lay readers with the intriguing,
charming, and slightly challenging title of Honeybee Democracy.11 Seeley argues that
the collective decisionmaking process through which honeybees pick a hive site holds
lessons for human beings.12 For Seeley, honeybees offer a real-world example (perhaps
the only real-world example?) of a perfectly functioning democracy.13
When a honeybee colony starts to outgrow its existing hive, it breeds a new queen,
and the old queen and most of the colony heads off to a new home.14 When they leave
the existing hive, they do not know where they are going. They just leave and then as-
semble in a massive swarm someplace close by.15 There they sit, for a few hours or a
6 Koch, supra note 1, at 438.
7 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
8 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
9 See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992).
10 Koch, supra note 1, at 442. This excerpt recalls James Madison: “If men were angels, no
government would be necessary.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
11 THOMAS D. SEELEY, HONEYBEE DEMOCRACY (2010). The book is helpfully reviewed by
Adrian Vermeule, The New Fable of the Bees, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.new
republic.com/book/review/honeybee-democracy-thomas-seeley.
12 See SEELEY, supra note 11, at 1.
13 See id. at 1–19.
14 See id. at 6 (describing the bees’ house-hunting process).
15 See id.
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few days, while they search for a site for the new colony.16 Some sites are better than
others, and the colony’s success depends greatly on picking a good spot. So hundreds
of scouts go house-hunting and report back to the whole group.17 The collective listens
to the reports, sends some more bees to check out the most promising sites, listens to
their reports, and then makes a collective decision about which site to choose.18 Consen-
sus achieved, they take off, en masse, and fly straight to their new home.19 With remark-
able reliability, this process produces the right outcome—the bees select the best of the
available alternatives.20
Sounds fantastic. How does it happen?
When scouts return to the swarm having located a possible site for the new home,
they do the famous “waggle dance” (also used by bees to tell their hive-mates where
good sources of nectar can be found) directly on the surface of the swarm.21 This alerts
other bees to the existence and location of a possible site. But what about its quality?
The bee communicates information about the quality of the site through the exuberance
of the dance—that is, how quickly she dances and how long the dance lasts.22 Other
bees then go check out the site, but because more bees will be exposed to a stronger
dance, more will go check out the site for which there is a more enthusiastic report.23
Assuming the later visitors are equally enthusiastic, support for a good site builds
quickly; support for poor sites disintegrates.
Seeley concludes with a very optimistic analogy to democratic elections. He states
that bees
conduct[ ] a frank debate among the scout bees supporting the vari-
ous proposed nest sites. This debate works much like a political
election, for there are multiple candidates (nest sites), competing
advertisements (waggle dances) for the different candidates, in-
dividuals who are committed to one or another candidate (scouts
supporting a site), and a pool of neutral voters (scouts not yet com-
mitted to a site). Also, the supporters for each site can become apa-
thetic and rejoin the pool of neutral voters. The election’s outcome
is biased strongly in favor of the best site because this site’s sup-
porters will produce the strongest dance advertisements and so will
gain converts the most rapidly, and because the best site’s sup-






21 See id. at 13–16.
22 See id. at 14.
23 See id. at 14–15.
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bees do not minimize conflict to reach this consensus. Specifically,
there is no suppression of dissenting views in the debate. More-
over, there is no pressure toward social conformity. Instead, each
scout bee makes her own, independent decision of whether or not
to support a site, based on her own, personal evaluation of the site,
not on how others judge the site. Thus the bees aggregate the infor-
mation about their options by conducting an open debate in which
the best site prevails by virtue of its superiority, as judged time and
time and time again by dozens, if not hundreds, of independent-
minded scout bees.24
Seeley’s comparison is to an election, but one might draw a similar optimistic com-
parison to notice-and-comment rulemaking, which generally also involves gathering
information and evaluating alternatives. The hope for notice-and-comment rulemaking
is that it will produce an outcome better than what the agency would have produced on
its own by tapping into the broader and deeper wisdom outside the agency. Perhaps
agency rulemaking has something to learn from honeybees?
It seems a great shame, but Seeley is, I am afraid, overstating the case. I loved this
book. But I am not convinced it has valuable lessons for collective decisionmaking by
human beings, at least in the political or policymaking arenas. The settings are too dis-
parate. The bees’ task looks daunting: they must make a vitally important decision in
a limited amount of time from among a large number of options. They have solved the
problem strikingly by combining interdependence with regard to agenda setting (which
potential sites should we look at) with independent evaluation (which of those sites is
the best). But compared to policymaking by human institutions, their task is unbeliev-
ably easy. For one thing, all the participants have equal resources and skills; no one
bee’s “voice” will drown out others or be more convincing than the merits of her posi-
tion justify. More abstractly, and more important, the bees are applying decisionmaking
criteria that are objective and agreed-upon; they are gathering information, not arguing
about values. And to the extent they are aggregating preferences, the preferences are
shared rather than conflicting or idiosyncratic. Seeley speaks of “views” about and
“support” for different options.25 But these terms are not quite right in that they imply
a subjectivity present in human debates and absent in the case of the bees. The differ-
ence is highlighted by the fact that no bee visits more than one potential site; there is no
direct comparison between sites, just an (implicit) comparison between the one site an
individual bee sees and the (inborn and shared) understanding of what makes a good
site.26 Supporters of the worse sites simply give up, because they know the site is not
that great, even if they have not seen a stronger dance about some other site.27 So there
24 Id. at 236.
25 See, e.g., id. (describing how the bees reach a consensus when selecting the best site).
26 See id. at 122 (“[Scout bees] are able to judge the absolute quality of a site through refer-
ence to an innate scale of nest-site goodness.”).
27 Id. at 137–45.
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is no convincing going on, there is a collective gathering of information that informs a
judgment driven by universally agreed-upon, objective criteria applied by utterly ratio-
nal decisionmakers.28
Alas, that is not what happens when human beings make group decisions.29 Unfor-
tunately, then, agencies cannot model their notice-and-comment processes on the wag-
gle dance. But considering the differences between how bees choose a new home and
how agencies write regulations still helps us think about what is taking place in notice-
and-comment rulemaking and what the role of comments (a.k.a. “human waggle
dances”) might or should be. It is to that issue that I now turn.
I. THE APA THESAURUS
A familiar canon of construction holds that each word in a statute has a distinct
meaning and none is superfluous. “It is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible,
to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which im-
plies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.”30
Of course, the assumption that statutory drafters do not just get out the thesaurus and
write a list of synonyms may be misplaced. Legal writing is often crammed with redun-
dant synonyms, and the judicial insistence that every word in a statute must have an
independent meaning can be fictional.31
28 Honeybees also do not make the sort of “errors” detailed by behavioral economists. So,
for example, bees who were initially supportive of a particular site do not become wed to it or
invest it with greater qualities than it actually has. No need, then, to worry about the endowment
effect with regard to honeybee due process. Cf. Paul R. Verkuil, An Essay on Due Process and
the Endowment Effect, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 563 (2013).
29 Adrian Vermeule suggests that honeybee democracy may still hold lessons for human
democracy in some settings:
In many cases, to be sure, human groups do not have bedrock common in-
terests or preferences. Instead they have genuine conflicts of interest or
incompatibilities of aims and values that go all the way down. Yet in such
cases heterogeneous groups tend to fissure into more homogeneous sub-
groups, or to drive out dissenters; over time, self-sorting tends to produce
human swarms with common preferences, implying that conflict will tend
to occur across rather than within groups.
Vermeule, supra note 11. That seems right to me. But “conflict . . . across rather than within
groups” is exactly what government agencies have to resolve, making rulemaking one of those
settings where the honeybees are, well, a different species. Indeed, Seeley too acknowledges that
in general human beings are engaged in “adversary democracy,” whereas “the group decision
making of swarm bees is ‘unitary democracy’ since it involves individuals who have congruent
interests (choose the best homesite) and share preferences (small entrance opening, etc.).”
SEELEY, supra note 11, at 118–19.
30 Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883); accord Ransom v. FIA Card Servs.,
N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011).
31 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
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It is not fictional, however, with regard to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).32 The APA is carefully and precisely written; a number of its provisions set out
a string of not-quite-synonyms, and the differences between these distinct terms should
be taken seriously. The point is not so much that judges should be more ferociously tex-
tualist in interpreting familiar APA phrases; I do not think we can or should return to
preambles that are truly “concise” and “general,” for example.33 Rather, considering the
particular terms chosen, especially where there are multiple terms, provides a window
into the drafters’ understanding of the administrative processes they were setting up
and a framework within which to place our own efforts to understand and reshape
those processes.
The APA contains a number of what we might call “thesauric” provisions. Most
involve phrases with which we are so familiar that we no longer hear or focus on the
actual words:
• “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law”34
• “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity”35
• “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right”36
• “assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs,
charges, or fees”37
• “agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspen-
sion, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or con-
ditioning of a license”38
None of this is poetry, or even the preamble to the Constitution. But it is precise,
thorough, and clear. Drafters who write like this are trying hard to cover all the bases.
They are choosing their words deliberately and with care. And they are thinking care-
fully about the processes they are setting out.39
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 934–36 (2013) (reporting that in actuality statutory drafters are often
self-consciously redundant).
32 Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559,
701–706 (2006)).
33 See § 553(c).
34 Id. § 706(2)(A).
35 Id. § 706(2)(B).
36 Id. § 706(2)(C).
37 Id. § 551(10)(E) (one of seven meanings of “sanction”).
38 Id. § 551(9) (definition of “licensing”). “License” is also a defined term; it comes in eight
flavors. Id. § 551(8) (“[L]icense includes the whole or part of an agency permit, certificate, ap-
proval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.”).
That means that “licensing” could in theory be any of eighty-eight different undertakings—the
eleven kinds of “licensing” multiplied by the eight kinds of “licenses”!
39 In at least one instance, this effort led the drafters astray. The APA defines “rule” as “an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect.” § 551(4) (emphasis
2013] “DATA, VIEWS, OR ARGUMENTS”: A RUMINATION 357
II. “DATA, VIEWS, AND ARGUMENTS”
I want to focus on one mildly thesauric provision in particular. It is in the first sen-
tence of § 553(c), which reads: “After notice required by this section, the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for
oral presentation.”40
I am especially interested in the four-word phrase “data, views, or arguments.” But
before turning to those terms, there is one other notable aspect of this provision—the
reference to “an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission.”41
The italicized terms are arguably unnecessary. The substance of the provision would
seem little different if it had provided that “the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to submit.” Instead, the provision highlights the direct involvement of those
outside the agency. It is an embrace of a sort of partnership between the agency and
these interested persons. “Participation” has become a watchword of contemporary
open government enthusiasts,42 but here it is in 1946. The premise is that those out-
side the agency have something important to contribute.
The language raises a second preliminary question: who outside the agency has
something important to contribute? The APA refers to “interested persons.”43 This
added). One leading scholar has said this “may be the most blatantly defective provision in the
Act.” Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of “Rule,” 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 1077, 1077 (2004). Then-Professor Antonin Scalia once observed that “it is
generally acknowledged that the only responsible judicial attitude toward this central APA defini-
tion is one of benign disregard.” Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit,
and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 383. The drafters’ error was adding “or
particular.” The essential feature of a rule is its general applicability; its command applies to
a class of cases rather than an individual. Particularity is the essential characteristic of an order.
Professor Levin explains what the words are doing there—they are an effort to exempt certain
decisions, such as ratemaking for a single firm, from the requirements for formal adjudications.
Levin, supra, at 1081–82.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the ‘or particular’ language in the definition
of ‘rule’ was a blunder. Those words are superfluous, because the last
clause of § 551(4) expressly defines ratemaking and kindred activities as
rulemaking. The drafters were guilty of overkill, because they did not
need to tinker with the opening clause in order to achieve the result they
sought. In the process of making the definition sufficiently comprehensive
to cover the exceptional cases for which they had separately provided
anyway, they made the definition meaningless.
Id. at 1082.
40 § 553(c).
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 See, e.g., Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (stating that government should
be transparent, participatory, and collaborative).
43 § 553(c) (emphasis added).
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language is often quoted but always overlooked. The assumption, usually implicit,
is that anyone who cares enough to submit comments is “interested.” But “interested”
can also mean having a stake. In a nutshell: is the opposite of “interested” uninterested
or disinterested? It seems likely that the drafters of the APA understood “interested”
to mean having a stake; they were focused in particular on regulated entities,44 though
there was also some concern for other affected parties. Moreover, for the term to do
any real work, it cannot mean “anyone who finds the rulemaking of interest,” be-
cause by definition anyone who submits a comment meets that standard. On the
other hand, to my knowledge no one has ever suggested limiting the right to comment
to stakeholders.45
The uncertainty is apparent in President Obama’s Executive Order on “Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review.”46 Section 2(c) states: “Before issuing a notice of
proposed rulemaking, each agency, where feasible and appropriate, shall seek the views
of those who are likely to be affected, including those who are likely to benefit from
and those who are potentially subject to such rulemaking.”47 Thus, here the open-gov-
ernment President is focused on stakeholders; he makes clear that they include not only
regulated entities but also regulatory beneficiaries, but he seems to draw the line there.
On the other hand, section 2(a) of the same order has no such limitation: “regulations
shall be based, to the extent feasible and consistent with law, on the open exchange of
information and perspectives among state, local, and tribal officials, experts in relevant
disciplines, affected stakeholders in the private sector, and the public as a whole.”48
The question of who participates has become especially salient in recent years as
the rulemaking process has moved online, enabling fuller participation by the lay pub-
lic. What has been primarily an insiders’ game has opened up, and significant effort is
being put into making it more accessible to all.49 Notice-and-comment rulemaking is
44 See, e.g., ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 56 (1941) [hereinafter ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S FINAL REPORT] (“Participation by [those upon whom agency authority is brought to
bear] in the rule-making process is essential in order to permit administrative agencies to
inform themselves and to afford adequate safeguards to private interests.”).
45 There seems to be no caselaw on the meaning of this term in § 553(c). In contrast, the
same term in the APA’s ex parte provision, § 557(d), has been the subject of litigation, and is
understood to limit the universe of covered individuals at least to some extent. See, e.g., Portland
Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
President is an “interested person” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)); Prof’l Air Traffic
Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that head of the American
Federation of Teachers was an “interested person” with regard to a dispute over the certification
of a different public employees’ union).
46 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
816 (2012).
47 Id. at 216.
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 See, e.g., Gregory D. Jones, Electronic Rulemaking in the New Age of Openness: Propos-
ing a Voluntary Two Tier Regulation System for Regulations.gov, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1261,
1262–70 (2010).
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seen as an example of self-governance, and of democracy in action; by definition, more
thorough-going and effective participation by the citizenry makes it more democratic.
But it is worth examining what exactly lay commenters bring to the process.
Under the APA, “participants” offer three distinct things: data, views, and argu-
ments. Those three terms seem carefully chosen. I do not want to attribute superhuman
exactitude to the drafters, who were not necessarily or always using these three terms
with utter precision.50 But it matters that these terms are not synonyms. Identifying
these three things—all three but only these three—reflects an implicit theory about
what it is that commenters might provide, which in turn reflects an implicit theory
about what it is rulewriters need to know in order to write good rules, which in turn re-
flects an implicit theory, most broadly, about what legitimizes agency action.
A. Data
The most straightforward of the three is “data.” Sound policy and effective regula-
tion are impossible without an adequate understanding of relevant facts. In the modern
world, “data” resonates in a way that it did not in 1946. Policy is to be “data-driven”;51
key insights are to be had by mining “big data.”52 But for purposes of understanding
50 For example, the Senate Report displays less care than I am giving the drafters credit for.
At one point, describing the rulemaking process, it summarizes: “Agencies must publish notice
and at least permit interested parties to submit their views in writing for agency consideration be-
fore issuing general regulations.” S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 7 (1945) (emphasis added). A few pages
later, it explains: “[a]gency notice must be sufficient to fairly apprise interested parties of the
issues involved, so that they may present responsive data or argument relating thereto.” Id. at
14 (emphasis added). Similarly, one early version of the House bill contained this predecessor
to §553(c):
(b) PROCEDURES.—In all cases in which notice of rule making is
required pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the agency shall afford
interested parties an adequate opportunity, reflected in its published rules
of procedure, to participate in the formulation of the proposed rule or rules
through (1) submission of written data or views, (2) attendance at confer-
ences or consultations, or (3) presentation of facts or argument at infor-
mal hearings.
Administrative Procedure Act, H.R. 339, 79th Cong. § 3(b) (1945). Here “data” and “facts” seem
to be paired synonyms, as do “views” and “argument.” The alternative reading is that “data” and
“views” are material best presented in writing and “facts” and “argument” best presented orally,
which would be mystifying.
51 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY & REECE RUSHING, GOVERNING BY THE NUMBERS: THE
PROMISE OF DATA-DRIVEN POLICYMAKING IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Apr. 2007), http://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/04/pdf/data_driven_policy_report.pdf [hereinafter CENTER
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS WHITE PAPER]; see also MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL (2004).
See generally Gary Wolf, The Data-Driven Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 2, 2010, at MM38.
52 See, e.g., TEACHAMERICA FOUNDATION, DEMYSTIFYING BIG DATA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT 6 (predicting that the impact of “big data”
on government will be “transformational”).
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§ 553,53 “data” seems simply a synonym for “information.” Of course gathering data
should be an element of notice and comment; if the process does nothing else, it should
inform the agency.54 As the 1941 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure explained, rulemaking
procedures . . . should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity
to all persons affected to present their views, the facts within their
knowledge, and the dangers and benefits of alternative courses.
They should also be adapted to eliciting, far more systematically
and specifically than a legislature can achieve, the information,
facts, and probabilities which are necessary to fair and intelli-
gent action.55
Historically, critical information was perceived to come most obviously from mem-
bers of the regulated community.56 Those directly affected by proposed regulations will
have the best information about their own products and activities. But the APA allows
comment by all “interested persons,” which clearly extends at least to regulatory benefi-
ciaries, and maybe more broadly than that. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s compila-
tion on the legislative history of the APA, quoting the Attorney General’s Committee,
notes that an agency’s “knowledge is rarely complete, and it must always learn the . . .
viewpoints of those whom its regulations will affect.”57
53 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
54 See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REP. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 20 (Comm. Print 1946) (“[P]ublic participation . . . in the rulemaking process
is essential in order to permit administrative agencies to inform themselves and to afford safe-
guards to private interests.”).
55 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S FINAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 102; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 216 (2013) (noting that because “crucial information
often comes from people in the private sphere, which has unique access to that information,” pro-
viding for public comment “is not merely sensible . . . it is indispensable”); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838,
1875 (2013) (“[T]hose outside of the federal government often have indispensable information,
and OIRA understands one of its crucial tasks as encouraging the receipt and careful consider-
ation of that information.”).
56 On the challenges involved in getting information from regulated entities themselves,
see Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (2004).
57 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REP. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 20 (Comm. Print 1946) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Attorney General’s
Committee “was very specific in its recommendation that those who are affected by rules should
have an opportunity to express their views with respect to those rules.” ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
FINAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 68; see also Hearing on the Administrative Procedure Act
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. (1945) (statement of C.A. Miller), reprinted
in S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 69 (1946).
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We are presently in the middle of a shift in understanding about the nature of the
information that can be collected through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The tradi-
tional view, implicit in the legislative history of the APA, is that the sources of informa-
tion will be experts.58 In turn, experts will almost always be either specialists in a field
or participants in the industry or activity to be regulated.
If the old idea was to dismiss lay contribution with a dismissive, “What do they
know?,” the last decade has seen increasing recognition that the public knows a lot.
Crowds are “wise.”59 They possess phenomenal “dispersed knowledge.”60 The best way
to solve a problem is crowdsourcing.61 This is the lesson, most famously, of Wikipedia,
and it is a central theme of much contemporary writing about the Internet.62
These principles have been endorsed within the executive branch. President
Obama’s Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government,63 the very first execu-
tive memorandum of his presidency, is a much-invoked endorsement of transparent,
participatory, and collaborative government. Its explicit theory as to why citizens
should participate in government is not that their views matter; indeed, it is silent on that
score. Rather, it states that they have important information to bring to bear:
Public engagement enhances the Government’s effectiveness and
improves the quality of its decisions. Knowledge is widely dis-
persed in society, and public officials benefit from having access
to that dispersed knowledge. Executive departments and agencies
should offer Americans increased opportunities to participate in
policymaking and to provide their Government with the benefits
of their collective expertise and information. Executive depart-
ments and agencies should also solicit public input on how we
can increase and improve opportunities for public participation
in Government.64
58 See, e.g., THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 1–5 (1946).
59 See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND
NATIONS (2004).
60 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 19 (2006).
61 See, e.g., BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE
GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL (2009); DON
TAPSCOTT, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 3 (2010).
62 See, e.g., Joshua Porter, The One Crucial Idea of Web 2.0, BOKARDO (Mar. 17, 2006),
http://bokardo.com/archives/the-one-crucial-idea-of-web-20 (“If there is one idea that encapsu-
lates what Web 2.0 is about . . . it’s the idea of leveraging the network to uncover the Wisdom
of Crowds.”).
63 Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
64 Id. Note also the “meta” aspect of the last sentence: the public will have knowledge about
how to go about accessing the knowledge held by the public. The problem of infinite regress
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It is striking that the argument here sounds not in democracy or accountability, but
in what might be termed data production. Perhaps the memorandum should not be
taken at face value. It is hard to disentangle the permanent campaign from governance.
But I do not think that the memorandum and accompanying efforts are merely public
relations. The Obama administration genuinely buys into the dispersed knowledge/
crowdsourcing/wisdom-of-crowds cluster of ideas.
Former Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Administrator Cass Sunstein
has portrayed notice-and-comment rulemaking in particular as a technique for drawing
on dispersed knowledge:
In the current era, it is far easier than ever before to have access to
dispersed knowledge. Consider the rulemaking process itself. A
large advantage of notice-and-comment rulemaking is that it allows
agencies to offer proposals, and supporting analyses, that are sub-
ject to public scrutiny, and that can benefit from knowledge that is
widely dispersed in society. On numerous occasions in the last
eighteen months, final rules have been significantly different from
proposed rules, and public comments are a key reason.65
Sunstein’s model of how this alchemy works draws on Hayek. Hayek celebrated
the price system as a “marvel” through which small pieces of dispersed, private, un-
shared information were aggregated and widely communicated.66 Electronic networks
could, in theory, serve the same function. Wikipedia stands as the primary example.67
Prediction markets are another.68 But these tools have yet to be effectively harnessed
by the notice-and-comment process. Sunstein’s happy assertion that public comments
have been a “key reason” for changes between proposed and final rules has some
looms. The public will also have knowledge about how to access the public’s knowledge about
how to access the knowledge held by the public.
65 Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Remarks on the 30th
Anniversary of the Regulatory Flexibility Act: Open Government is Analytic Government (and
Vice-Versa) 6 (Sep. 21, 2010); accord SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 216 (stating that while
“public officials know a lot . . . . crucial information often comes from people in the private
sphere, which has unique access to that information”).
66 SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 14–15.
67 See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 109–42 (2008).
68 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 103–45 (describing prediction markets and arguing
that they provide valuable information for regulators and other public institutions); Michael
Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004) (arguing that agencies should take prediction markets’
prognostications into account in making their own predictive judgments).
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support,69 but most research cuts the other way.70 Moreover, It is not clear that such
changes resulted from new information contained in public comments.
All of this returns us to the honeybees. The jacket blurb for Honeybee Democracy,
implicitly invoking the principle of the wisdom of crowds, states that the book “shows
that decision-making groups, whether honeybee or human, can be smarter than even the
smartest individuals in them.”71
The problem here is that taking the existing notice-and-comment process and mov-
ing it online is completely inadequate to tap into the citizenry’s dispersed knowledge.
Participation rates are way too low.72 The questions asked are too open-ended.73 The
setting creates an incentive to be argumentative and one-sided rather than honest, accu-
rate, and complete.74
Furthermore, rulemaking generally involves issues as to which crowds are not all
that wise. For example, in the classic wisdom-of-crowds type problem, a specific fac-
tual issue (such as the weight of an ox or the number of jelly beans in a jar) is presented,
people have distinct or private sources of information, and one person’s opinion or
guess is unknown to and cannot affect anyone else’s.75 Whether to list the polar bear as
69 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411 (2005); Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest
Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY
103 (2006).
70 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and
Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 912–13 (2006) (arguing that lay comments are unlikely
to provide useful or influential information); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the
Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2013) (reviewing
comments on proposed “Volcker Rule” under the Dodd-Frank Act, and concluding that the in-
dustry submissions were hugely more polished and convincing, and thus likely to be influential,
than lay submissions); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99
(2011) (surveying multiple EPA rulemakings and concluding that industry accounted for eighty-
one percent of the comments filed and that eighty-three percent of the changes made between the
proposed and final rules weakened the rule); see also Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups
in the Rulemaking Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 245, 250, 252 (1998) (reporting dominance of business interests in the comment-
ing process).
71 SEELEY, supra note 11, at book jacket. The blurbist is careful: all that has been demon-
strated is that groups can be smarter than their smartest member, not that they always or even
usually are.
72 See Benjamin, supra note 70, at 933–35.
73 See Fred Emery & Michael Emery, A Modest Proposal: Improve E-Rulemaking by
Improving Comments, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 1, 8 (2005) (arguing that agencies will gen-
erate better public comments if they list specific issues on which they are seeking comment).
74 See Jones, supra note 49, at 1266 (discussing general shortcomings of modern notice-
and-comment).
75 SUROWIECKI, supra note 59, at XVI–XXI.
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an endangered species, what level of ozone will protect the public health, how to de-
fine “proprietary trading,” or whether the Plan B contraceptive is appropriately sold
to fifteen-year-olds without a prescription just are not that sort of problem. And were
notice-and-comment to become a more deliberative process, in at least some cases that
would only increase the opening for the pathologies rather than the benefits of group
decisionmaking. Particularly where the right answer is hard to recognize even if it is
offered (as opposed to so-called “Eureka problems”—those where everyone realizes
the answer has been found once someone hits on it), the very process of deliberation
can amplify error and aggregate prejudice and misinformation.76 In many settings
there is a risk that turning to the crowd will produce worse information, not better,
since the particular conditions under which crowds are “wise” will not exist.77 Perhaps
it is no surprise, then, that in a recent report from the IBM Center for the Business of
Government entitled, and devoted to, Using Crowdsourcing in Government, the word
“rulemaking” does not appear.78
This is not to say that opening up notice-and-comment to outsiders cannot or will
never provide better information. It is only to say that simply increasing access will not
magically do so. The most sophisticated and important efforts to meet this challenge are
to be found at the Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative and its “Regulation Room” project.79
They have not yet solved the problem, but have offered the most helpful and nuanced
account of exactly how lay commenters can contribute important information to
rulewriters.80 An important conclusion is that the most useful lay comments will come
not from members of the general public but from individuals who possess “situated
knowledge.” “This knowledge is based on their on-the-ground experiences with the
kinds of problems, circumstances, or solutions involved in the proposed regulation.”81
Such knowledge might reveal levels of complexity of which the agency was unaware,
hidden contributions to existing problems, possible unintended consequences of partic-
ular proposed solutions, or ways of thinking about a problem that just had not occurred
to policymakers without day-to-day, on-the-ground experience. Such information will
76 SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 103–04, 127–29, 138–42; see also Cary Coglianese, The
Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking 28 (Harvard University Faculty Research
Working Paper Series No. RWP 0-044, 2004) (“Greatly expanding participation could very
well exacerbate cognitive cascades and tendencies toward groupthink that can afflict pol-
icy deliberations.”).
77 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 103–45.
78 See DAREN C. BRABHAM, USING CROWDSOURCING IN GOVERNMENT (2013).
79 See Cynthia Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 397 (2011) (provid-
ing an overview of the Regulation Room Project).
80 See Cynthia Farina et al., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public Rule-
making Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185 (2012).
81 Cynthia Farina & Mary Newhardt, Rulemaking 2.0: Understanding and Getting Better
Public Participation, CORNELL E-RULEMAKING INITIATIVE PUBLICATIONS 15 (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=ceri.
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not be relevant and available in every or even most rulemakings, and will be pre-
sented in a narrative form that does not much resemble traditional, professionally
prepared comments.82
B. Argument
For honeybees choosing the site for a new hive, information is all that is at stake.
Section 553(c) of the Honeybee Administrative Procedure Act, HAPA, says that all in-
terested bees can participate “through submission of waggled data, without opportunity
for oral presentation.”83 But agency decisions turn on, and the APA expressly protects
the ability of interested persons to submit, more than just information.
A second thing interested persons can submit is “arguments,” i.e., reasons to do, or
not to do, something. I don’t really have much to say about this category, about which
there is little to, shall we say, argue. Of course agencies should be aware of arguments
for and against their proposed rules. “Arguments” surely include discussions of the
agencies’ legal obligations or constraints, an understanding of which is an essential ob-
jective of notice-and-comment rulemaking, but the statute does not say and is not
limited to “legal arguments.” Agencies do things for reasons. They must engage in
“reasoned decisionmaking.”84 To figure out what paths to take, they need to hear argu-
ments, i.e., reasons pointing to particular conclusions. As the Report of the Attorney
General’s Committee put it, in language roughly that of the final statute, rulemaking
“should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons affected to present
their views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and benefits of alter-
native courses.”85
Some of the above discussion about whether members of the lay public have useful
information can also be applied to the question whether they will be able to make effec-
tive, relevant, and useful arguments. But arguments rise and fall on their own merits.
C. Views
The trickiest of the three sorts of public submissions is “views.” It is noteworthy
that the statute identifies this as a distinct category, not implicit in the first two. One
might have thought that “views” were the result of combining “data” and “arguments.”
But the APA implicitly says they are not. If views are relevant, and views are different
from data and arguments, then rulemaking is not a wholly technocratic process and
82 See Jackeline Solivan & Cynthia Farina, Regulation Room: How the Internet Improves
Public Participation in Rulemaking, CORNELL E-RULEMAKING INITIATIVE PUBLICATIONS
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ceri/13.
83 Surely you weren’t really expecting a cite.
84 E.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483–84 (2011); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998).
85 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S FINAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 102 (emphasis added).
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agencies may be valuably informed by learning about the views, or attitudes, of inter-
ested persons. The challenge, as we shall see, is to identify exactly how, if at all, views
that are not supported by data or arguments are useful to any agency. In actuality, agen-
cies for the most part ignore such free-standing statements,86 and it is hard to see how
they could do differently.
1. Statutory Limits
One general point at the outset. Whether and how “views” might count will always
depend in part on the terms of the relevant background statute. One could imagine
Congress specifically instructing the agency to take public sentiment into account, or
specifically foreclosing doing so. I am not aware of a statute that explicitly does either.87
However, a statute that expressly limits relevant considerations implicitly forecloses re-
liance on public sentiment. This is the lesson of, among other decisions, Massachu-
setts v. EPA.88 There, the EPA denied a petition requesting that it regulate emissions
of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) from automobiles. The Clean Air Act provides that
the EPA Administrator “shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class . . . of new motor vehicles . . . which in
[the Administrator’s] judgment cause [sic], or contribute [sic] to, air pollution . . . rea-
sonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”89 The EPA denied the
petition for two reasons. First, it thought that GHGs were not “air pollutants” within the
meaning of the Act, and therefore it lacked the authority to regulate their emission
from automobiles.90 Second, even if it had such authority, it thought that regulating
GHG under the Clean Air Act was a very bad idea.91 This was for many reasons, not
the least of them being that the President believed in a voluntary approach to GHG
86 See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 70, at 913–14. For example, consider the following some-
what plaintive lament:
During the public comment period for receiving information, . . . we re-
ceived over 2,750 comments. Despite our request for specific scientific
and commercial information, the vast majority of commenters simply
noted their opposition to the petition to delist the Southern Resident killer
whale DPS, while a handful of comments supported the petition. . . . We
did receive several substantive comments regarding both the biological
and legal aspects of the DPS determination as raised in the petition.
NOAA Listing Endangered or Threatened Species: 12-Month Finding on a Petition to Delist the
Southern Resident Killer Whale, 78 Fed. Reg. 47,277, 47,279 (Aug.5, 2013), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-08-05/pdf/2013-18824.pdf. To paraphrase: We wanted data
and arguments, but just about all we got was views.
87 Accord Benjamin, supra note 70, at 907–08.
88 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
89 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
90 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 513–14.
91 Id. at 512–13.
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reductions and thought that unilateral reductions would harm the U.S. position in
international negotiations about global GHG reductions.92 The Supreme Court re-
jected both grounds for denying the petition.93
With regard to the relevance of the President’s “views,” the Court purported to be
agnostic about their merits, but it rejected reliance on them because, whether sensible
or not, they were not on the table under the statute.94 The statute says that if in the
Administrator’s judgment GHGs emitted by mobile sources may reasonably be an-
ticipated to endanger public health and welfare, then the agency must regulate those
emissions.95 Therefore, the only statutorily relevant question is whether GHGs may rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare. Note that Congress had
not expressly precluded other factors, including those relied on by the EPA; the statute
was simply silent about them. A strong reading of Massachusetts v. EPA puts off-
limits considerations that are logically relevant to the decision to be made—i.e., rea-
sonable people exercising their discretion would consider them—but are not mentioned
by the statute. However, it is probably a mistake to read the decision this broadly. The
more modest understanding is that in this case the Court thought Congress had pro-
hibited consideration of these factors by stating that the Administrator “shall” regulate
when certain conditions are met, period. That is, Congress has not actually been silent
about these considerations, including the President’s views; it had been meaningfully
silent, in an expressio unius fashion.
The Court was not focused on the fact that the source of the EPA’s reservations
was the White House. If the EPA had said “it seems to us that regulating these sources
is a mistake,” rather than “it seems to the President that regulating these sources is a
mistake,” the opinion and the result would have been identical. And just the same
would have been true if the agency had deferred to a strong expression of public views.
Even this reading (and certainly the strong reading) of Massachusetts v. EPA is
in some tension with a presidential model of administration.96 Prominent among fac-
tors not enumerated by statute will always be presidential preferences. Of course,
the President does not make those preferences known through the submission of com-
ments during the notice-and-comment rulemaking, and does not rely on § 553(c) to
allow him to “participate” by submitting “views.”97 But a statute that precludes con-
sideration of the President’s views would seem also to preclude consideration of the
public’s views. And some of the arguments for taking the President’s views into
92 Id.
93 Id. at 501.
94 Id. at 533–34.
95 Id. at 506.
96 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339 (2001)
(describing and endorsing active presidential oversight of agency policymaking).
97 On the many routes of White House influence on agency decisionmaking, see Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenberg, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006).
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account are also arguments for taking the public’s views into account, since the rea-
son the President’s views matter—what legitimates his authority over the executive
branch—is that he has been selected by the public.
2. Views and Votes
The least complex understanding of a “view” is that it is a statement of a bottom-
line: a conclusion stripped of supporting rationale, facts, and elaboration. For example,
“It’s always been my view that agency regulations do more harm than good.”
Consider a few actual rulemaking comments from individuals that might be seen
as expressions of views. (In each instance, what is set out constitutes the entire submis-
sion; they are not edited down to just the unhelpful bits.)
“Please DO NOT allow smoking of electronic cigarettes on
aircraft”98
“regulate [sic]”99
“this regulation is needed immediately to reverse the dangerous
trend of distracted driving, and needs, at some point to be extended
to all motorists. [sic]”100
“It is important to put into place guidelines/restrictions on emis-
sions from our power plants. These restrictions on new plants are
a start, although I support regulating the emissions of all power
plants. Please support these new restrictions on new power plants.
It is a beginning!”101
These are homemade variations on the other typical form of lay comment, which
is the submission of a brief email (or, historically and still occasionally, postcard) writ-
ten by an advocacy group for submission by its members. Such mass comments do not
inform the agency of anything other than the fact that a bunch of people agree with the
sentiments expressed; each additional submission adds nothing except the very fact that
another person endorses the view expressed. The whole premise of a concerted effort
98 Comment from Addison, DOT-OST-2011-0044-0335 (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2011-0044-0335 (regarding proposed ban
on the smoking of electronic cigarettes on airplanes).
99 Comment from Val Laurent, FSOC-2010-0002-1094 (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-1094 (regarding the Volcker rule).
100 Comment from Paul E. Kikta, FMCSA-2009-0370-0048 (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FMCSA-2009-0370-0048 (regarding proposed ban
on texting while driving a commercial vehicle).
101 Comment, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-4337 (May 10, 2012), http://www.regulations
.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-4337 (regarding proposed regulation
of greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants).
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to get multiple people to tell the agency the same thing over and over is that the content
of each submission after the first is unimportant; what counts is the fact that someone
cared enough to make it.
What should an agency do with such expressions of views? These comments are,
in essence, votes. But is notice-and-comment an election?
Almost since the APA was passed, the rulemaking process has been surrounded
by a good deal of rhetoric about its essentially democratic character.102 Indeed, at the
time the Act was considered and enacted, a standard proposition was that notice-and-
comment was a response to the unrepresentative nature of agencies.103 The Final Report
of the Attorney General’s Commission expressly rejected modeling rulemaking proce-
dures on the legislative process precisely because agencies were not representative
bodies, whose “members in theory bring with them a large part of the knowledge and
opinion out of which after open discussion the laws are to be framed.”104 Because an
agency’s job is “not to ascertain and register its will,” it had to follow a process that
would provide it the information and views of those affected by its decisions.105 On
this account, notice-and-comment becomes a direct substitute for and an equivalent
of voting. This conception is reflected in judicial opinions. “The essential purpose of
according § 553 notice and comment opportunities,” writes the D.C. Circuit, “is to
reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental
authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies.”106 “[P]ublic participation
assures that the agency will have before it the facts and information relevant to a par-
ticular administrative problem . . . [and] increase[s] the likelihood of administrative
responsiveness to the needs and concerns of those affected.”107
A tendency to conceive of the notice-and-comment process as a sort of referendum
can be seen among lay participants and observers. For example, when the Department
of the Interior proposed restricting snowmobile access to Yellowstone National Park,
it received 360,000 comments, eighty percent of which supported a ban on snowmo-
biles.108 The final rule expanded snowmobile access.109 In an article entitled “Flooded
102 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 66–67 (1969)
(discussing the superiority of rulemaking procedure over adjudicative procedure for making law
or policy affecting a large scope of people).
103 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S FINAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 101–02.
104 Id. at 101.
105 Id. at 101–02.
106 Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Texaco, Inc. v. FPC,
412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969) (identifying the primary purpose of § 553 as being “to give the
public an opportunity to participate in the rule-making process” and mentioning that “[i]t also
enables the agency promulgating the rule to educate itself”).
107 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (alterations in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d
658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
108 Katharine Q. Seelye, Flooded with Comments, Officials Plug Their Ears, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2002, at C4.
109 Id.
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with Comments, Officials Plug Their Ears,” The New York Times reported that “offi-
cials say the sheer volume of public comment is not a determining factor. ‘It is not a
vote,’” said one park official.110 This prompted a letter to the editor calling it “reprehen-
sible” that “park administrators chose to ignore the overwhelming support in favor” of
a ban.111 “Whether the support comes in the form of personal letters or e-mail is irrele-
vant—the sentiment is what matters.”112
Researchers at the Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative (CeRI) have observed what they
label “the voting instinct” among public commenters. In cooperation with the Depart-
ment of Transportation, CeRI has created a rulemaking participation platform aimed at
generating effective, informed, and useful lay comments in actual rulemakings.113 The
project team seeks to increase the level of public participation, and to produce com-
ments that are either more useful to the agency or more satisfying to the commenter,
or both. This requires getting the word out, educating participants about the nature of
the process, and facilitating comprehension of the proposal. Trained discussion leaders
break the preamble into discrete, manageable portions, explain specific issues and com-
ponents, and moderate discussions.114 The goal is to overcome the ignorance, unaware-
ness, and information overload that stands in the way of effective public participation.115
In what they consider perhaps “the most valuable insight to come from Regulation
Room,” Professor Farina and her colleagues have found that “Web 2.0 technologies and
methods offer extraordinary opportunities for lowering the barriers to public engage-
ment in rulemaking, but Web culture and expectations often fundamentally conflict
with getting ‘more better’ participation.”116 They give several examples of this dynamic,
but the most interesting and important is “the voting instinct.”117
Rulemaking 2.0 takes place at the intersection of two powerful cul-
tural patterns. The first is the popular equation in the United States
of democratic voice with casting a vote, or, it’s [sic] privatized
equivalent, responding to a poll. Because voting is how “public
participation” is culturally constructed, site visitors already “know”
110 Id.
111 Leo G. Weiss, Letter to the Editor, Snowmobile Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002,
at D12.
112 Id. Similarly, a recent Washington Post article mocking Department of Agriculture regula-
tions noted: “The government asked for public comments in 2008. It got 997. Just 50 com-
menters were in favor of the rule as written. But that, apparently, was enough. After a years-long
process, the rule took effect . . . .” David A. Fahrenthold, Watch Him Pull a USDA-Mandated
Rabbit Disaster Plan out of His Hat, WASH. POST, July 17, 2013, at A1.
113 The project, which can be found at http://www.regulationroom.org, is described in Farina
et al., supra note 79.
114 Farina et al., supra note 79, at 413–14.
115 Id. at 417–19.
116 Id. at 419.
117 Id. at 429–32.
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how the public provides input in government decisionmaking.
Everyone “understands” that the side with the most votes wins.
The second pattern is from online culture: Voting is how the Web
works. Ranking or rating—by assigning stars, sliding a bar, or
simply clicking “Like” or “Recommend”—is a staple of Web 2.0
interactivity. Like the gladiators of ancient Rome, web content
lives or dies by whether the crowd gives thumbs up, or down. The
confluence of these two patterns may create such a powerful “vot-
ing instinct” that the presence of even fairly modest preference-
aggregation devices causes users to ignore other signals that they
really ought to learn more about how rulemaking works.118
On this account, “voting impulse” might be a better term than “voting instinct,”
since the attitude is mainly a learned one. In any event, the Regulation Room re-
searchers have seen it repeatedly expressed in specific comments (e.g., the e-mail that
complains “I can’t figure out how to vote”) and overall behavior (e.g., an unwillingness
to take the time to seriously engage with the materials).119
On the other hand, this conception of notice-and-comment rulemaking as a plebi-
scite has not made much progress with insiders. Among academics, agency officials,
and the judiciary, there remains universal agreement that rulemaking is not about pref-
erence aggregation. Regulations.gov is explicit that “the comment process is not a
vote.”120 Professor Farina and her colleagues describe “better” public participation as
being that which, among other things, “comport[s] with the nature of rulemaking as a
technocratically rational (as opposed to preference aggregation) process.”121 In a recent
article on the legal aspects of e-rulemaking, Bridget Dooling writes that to acknowledge
the value of lay participation in rulemaking “does not imply that rulemaking is a plebi-
scite. That point is settled.”122 Nina Mendelson has come closest to contesting this view.
She argues agencies should give weight to non-technical public comments that express
118 Id. at 431–32 (citations omitted).
119 Id. at 427.
120 REGULATIONS.GOV, TIPS FOR SUBMITTING EFFECTIVE COMMENTS 2, http://www
.regulations.gov/docs/Tips_For_Submitting_Effective_Comments.pdf (last visited Dec. 12,
2013); see also id. at 3 (“Many in the public mistakenly believe that their submitted form let-
ter constitutes a ‘vote’ regarding the issues concerning them. Although public support or oppo-
sition may help guide important public policies, agencies make determinations for a proposed
action based on sound reasoning and scientific evidence, not a majority of votes. A single, well-
supported comment may carry more weight than a thousand form letters.”).
121 Farina et al., supra note 79, at 410.
122 Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 893, 901 n.31
(2011); see also Benjamin, supra note 70, at 905–07; Bill Funk, The Public Needs a Voice in
Policy. But Is Involving the Public in Rulemaking a Workable Idea?, CPRBLOG, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Apr. 13, 2010), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog
=F74D5F86-B44E-2CBB-ED1507624B63809E.
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or reflect values that are relevant to the agency’s decision123 (I will return to this below).
But even she is quite clear that notice-and-comment should not be a referendum.124 And
notwithstanding their openness to the idea that participation in rulemaking is a response
to the nonrepresentative nature of agencies,125 courts have explicitly rejected the popu-
larity contest model.126
Agency officials are only human: When their conclusion has strong support in the
comments they tend to note that fact,127 and when it does not they tend to glide over
it.128 And the fact that non-governmental organizations continue to urge their members
to submit multiple duplicative comments indicates that they think sheer numbers may
indeed move the agency.129 But I am not aware of any agency actually endorsing the
123 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343 (2011).
124 Id. at 1374 (denying “that an agency should tally up the total number of comments for or
against a particular issue and have that serve as a referendum or a dispositive vote of some
sort on the policy issue at hand. The judicial opinions saying agencies need not do this are
clearly correct”).
125 See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“The pur-
pose of a rulemaking proceeding is not merely to vote up or down the specific proposals ad-
vanced before the proceeding begins, but to refine, modify, and supplement the proposals in the
light of evidence and arguments presented in the course of the proceeding.”); U.S. Cellular Corp.
v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the agency “has no obligation to take
the approach advocated by the largest number of commenters; indeed, the Commission may
adopt a course endorsed by no commenter” (citations omitted)); NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104,
122 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The substantial-evidence standard has never been taken to mean
that an agency rulemaking is a democratic process by which the majority of commenters prevail
by sheer weight of numbers. Regardless of majority sentiment within the community of com-
menters, the issue is whether the rules are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The
number and length of comments, without more, is not germane to a court’s substantial-evidence
inquiry.” (citations omitted) ). A whiff of disregard for the voting model can be sensed in Judge
Randolph’s opinion in the greenhouse gasses case. There he writes that “[i]n response to EPA’s
request for public comments . . . the agency received nearly 50,000 submissions. Most were short
expressions of support for the petition; many were nearly identical.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 415
F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
127 See, e.g., 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, EPA & DOT, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,636
(Oct. 15, 2012) (noting that an “overwhelming majority of commenters supports the pro-
posed” rule).
128 See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
129 According to political scientist Stuart Shulman:
While these campaigns are presumed to be largely ineffective because
they generate little new information, in some instances (e.g., the EPA’s
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Definition of U.S.
Waters, or the USDA’s organic rulemaking, where about 100,000 unique
comments carried weight with officials and influenced the final rule),
it does at least appear to contribute to an outcome favorable to the
mass mailers.
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plebiscite model. Consider one of the more striking instances in which the weight of
numerous comments was ignored: the FCC’s 2003 media ownership rules.130 That pro-
posal drew something like two million comments,131 99.9% of which opposed what the
Commission (which divided three to two) did.132 The order for the Commission major-
ity essentially ignored the fact that public sentiment was so one-sided. Not surprisingly,
the two dissenters did not.133 But they both rejected the referendum model.134 Moreover,
political scientist Stuart Shulman has concluded that “astroturf” campaigns by public
interest groups who get thousands of members to send identical messages can actually
undercut the commenters’ substantive position.135 Agency staffers are overwhelmed
and annoyed. If he is correct, then the agency is quite emphatically not treating the
process as a referendum.
Many anticipated that the move to electronic rulemaking would prompt a shift in
participants’ understanding of the basic nature of the process toward the referendum
model.136 It is striking how resistant everyone has been to such a shift, and overall few
Stuart Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemak-
ing, 3 J. E-GOV’T. 41, 46 (2006).
130 See Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620
(2003). The rulemaking is described, and the Commission’s rejection of overwhelmingly nega-
tive public comment criticized, in Mary M. Underwood, Comment, On Media Consolidation,
the Public Interest, and Notice and Agency Consideration of Comments, 60 ADMIN. L. REV.
185 (2008).
131 The FCC’s decision does not make clear exactly how many comments were in fact re-
ceived. Compare 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620, 13,624 (“We received more than 500,000 brief com-
ments and form letters . . . .”), with id. at 13,977 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting) (“We have
heard from nearly two million people in opposition to relaxing our ownership rules . . . .”).
132 Id. at 13,978 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting).
133 See, e.g., id. at 13,977 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting) (“Judging from our record, public
opposition is nearly unanimous, from ultra-conservatives to ultra-liberals, and virtually everyone
in between. We have heard from nearly two million people in opposition to relaxing our owner-
ship rules, and only a handful in support.”).
134 See id. at 13,958 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting) (“The FCC is not, of course, a public
opinion survey agency. Nor should we make our decisions by weighing the letters, cards and
e-mails ‘for’ and the letters, cards and e-mails ‘against’ and awarding the victory to the side that
tips the scale.”); id. at 13,978 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting) (“I have heard it said we cannot
make this decision by polls or by weighing postcards. That is fair enough.”).
135 Shulman, supra note 128, at 58.
136 See, e.g., Michael Herz, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY PRACTICE, 2002–2003, at 129, 149 (Jeffrey Lubbers ed., 2004) (predicting that an
agency confronted with millions of comments will “[u]navoidably . . . start to do what, for exam-
ple, members of Congress do: avoid the subtleties and keep a running tally with the grossest
sort of division—basically ‘for’ or ‘against’”); Peter Strauss, Professor, Columbia Law Sch.,
Remarks at the E-Rulemaking Conference, American University Center for Rulemaking 28
(Jan. 8, 2004), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20060920113741/www.american.edu
/academic.depts/provost/rulemaking/transcripts.pdf (noting that the impulse to treat mass com-
ments as votes will be “quite strong”).
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inroads on the traditional, it’s-not-a-vote model have been made. The agency is con-
strained by law and by fact, expected to apply its expertise, part of a presidential admin-
istration, and to some extent exercising independent judgment.137
Despite all this, there has long been an undercurrent in administrative law push-
ing toward a more frank endorsement (or at least acknowledgement) of the role of
politics in rulemaking. Three decades ago, then-Professor Antonin Scalia wrote that
agencies “may make some decisions in rulemaking not because they are the best or
the most intelligent, but because they are what the people seem to want.”138 (To stick
with our current vocabulary, one might rewrite this statement to say that agencies may
make some decisions in rulemaking not because they are supported by data or sup-
ported by argument, but because they reflect the public’s views.) Scalia’s point was
not that all rulemaking is or should be political; often an agency has a technocratic
task to which political considerations are irrelevant. But actions taken under broad
delegations—for example, to manage the airwaves “in the public interest, convenience
and necessity”139—were properly informed by political judgments. The challenge, he
acknowledged, was distinguishing the two settings.
3. Views and Values
Agency decisions often turn in part on values. If values count, then aren’t straight-
forward statements of “views” relevant to the decision? In a word, “views” are “data.”
Nina Mendelson argues that when agencies are resolving policy issues that turn on
questions of value, “value-laden comments, including comments from laypersons that
arrive in large volumes,” merit “systematic consideration.”140
137 See, e.g., Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“The
purpose of a rulemaking proceeding is not merely to vote up or down the specific proposals ad-
vanced before the proceeding begins, but to refine, modify, and supplement the proposals in the
light of evidence and arguments presented in the course of the proceeding.”); Funk, supra note
122 (arguing that notice-and-comment rulemaking is not a political exercise and expressing con-
cern that encouraging broad participation by the general public will misleadingly induce com-
menters to see the process as a referendum).
138 Antonin Scalia, Chairman’s Message, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV., at v
(1982). For a discussion, see Michael Herz, Chair’s Message, “Rulemaking as Politics,” Thirty
Years On, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 1 (2012).
139 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (containing numerous ref-
erences to “the public interest, convenience and necessity”).
140 Mendelson, supra note 123, at 1371–72, 1380. Though decidedly more skeptical,
Cynthia Farina also has some sympathy for this position. Cynthia Farina et al., Rulemaking
vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation that Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL.
& ADMIN. L. 123, 142 (2012).
Note that while a “value-laden comment” might be a simple expression of a bottom line—
a vote—it is not necessarily so limited. Consider a few examples of comments that strongly
communicate certain values with only modest or no information or argument:
I oppose the shoot-on-site policy of the Wyoming Government.
People must get-over their “Red Riding Hood” “Three Little Pigs”
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mentality. Wolves are needed for the Ecosystem. HUNTERS, TROPHY
HUNTERS, gun and rifle association members, wolf haters are NOT
needed in Wyoming to murder/slaughter these magnificant animals. My
husband and self visit Wyoming ONLY to hear and see the wolves, their
free-spirit of a DYING WEST because of MAN. STOP THIS HATRED
OF THIS BEAUTIFUL ANIMAL AND LEARN THROUGH EDUCA-
TION TO EXIST W>THEM. GOD bless the wolves—stay safe and away
from the crazies!!
Place the grey wolves back on the Endangered Species List. STOP allow-
ing the politicians of your state and the Federal Government to be in the
back pockets of the lobbyists for hunting. STOP THE KILLINGS! I try
to teach my children and grandchildren what you are doing in Wyoming,
Idaho and Montana is wrong. IT IS MURDER, it is NOT HUNTING. The
hunters do NOT carry home the wolves to e at, they enjoy the THRILL
OF THE KILL AND THE HATRED THAT GOES WITH IT. ENOUGH
is ENOUGH! Leave the wilderness and the animals alone. God did NOT
give man the right to kill his creations, when they are not benefiting man’s
survivial for food. IT IS MURDER and the BLOOD is on each of your
hands as each wolf is slaughtered. God bless the wolves!! May they have
the strength to run from the murderers.
Comment from Barbara Laxson, FWS-R6-ES-2011-0039-2465 (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FWS-R6-ES-2011-0039-2465.
I urge the EPA to limit industrial carbon pollution from new and existing
power plants. I support the EPA’s proposal to limit industrial carbon pollu-
tion from power plants. Clean air is better for everyone, especially the po-
lar bears and climate change. Innovate new clean energy technologies for
now and the future. Stop being so greedy and not caring for this world.
Comment from Donna McWhirter, EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-6909 (May 25, 2012), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-6909 (regarding EPA
proposed rule to limit GHGs from power plants).
This is nothing but a sociopathic, manipulative, typical corporate scam
. . . . . . when will they get a conscience???
Comment from Wayne Dimock, FDA-2010-P-0491-0706 (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2010-P-0491-0706 (regarding whether to allow
use of the term “corn sugar” rather than “corn syrup” on food labels).
This is simply idiotic. E-cigarettes are the same as traditional cigarettes in
name only; they contain none of the harmful secondhand side-effects.
Anyone even halfway educated about them would know this. But this
measure is not meant towards them; it is meant to appease the ignorant
masses that store their brain in their ass. Quit trying to regulate peoples’
lives and quit trying to pass laws to appease ignorant morons.
Comment from Anonymous, DOT-OST-2011-0044-0027 (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.regula
tions.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2011-0044-0027.
The Volcker Rule is critical to preventing banks from unscrupulous bank-
ing activities. At the expense of American citizens, their dependants, and
their posterity banks have made trillions of dollars for their CEO’s and
shareholders. It is time to stop their inner-circle deals and demand justice
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Doing this requires pulling off two tricks. The first is figuring out which comments
reflect “values” to which government officials should attend. This touches on a funda-
mental debate concerning the divergence between expert and lay judgments, which has
been a particular focus in the area of risk regulation. It is well known that the public is
very concerned about certain risks that experts dismiss as trivial, and unconcerned
about some risks experts know to be significant. This divergence has two sources. First,
we laypersons misestimate the magnitude of many risks. Second, we care about certain
qualitative aspects of risk—most familiarly, whether risks are voluntary—that experts
often ignore. If public comments about potential regulation of a risk diverge, in either
direction, from expert judgment, should the agency care? It could defer to them, or it
could try to determine whether the divergence rests on a value choice or on ignorance
and technical error.141 This is a fundamental question of democratic theory and risk reg-
ulation that I am not going to try to answer,142 but it requires answering to know which
comments should get “systematic consideration.”
The second trick is figuring out what this consideration consists of. Mendelson
wants agencies to do something other than just ignore mass comments.143 But it is a
for every American. I will not allow some bank to rob me and my family
of everything that we work for with our blood, sweat, and tears.
Comment from Amy Margolis, FSOC-2010-0002-0523 (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.regulations
.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FSOC-2010-0002-0523.
141 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1078
(2000) (“[G]overnment’s task is to distinguish between lay judgments that are products of factual
mistakes (produced, for example, by the availability heuristic) and lay judgments that are prod-
ucts of judgments of value (as in the view that voluntarily incurred risks deserve less attention
than involuntarily incurred ones).”). Sunstein strongly opposes simply deferring to uninformed
lay concerns about risk. In his view doing so
rests on a controversial and even unacceptable conception of democracy,
one that sees responsiveness to citizens’ demands, whatever their factual
basis, as the foundation of political legitimacy. If those demands are unin-
formed, it is perfectly appropriate for government to resist them. Indeed,
it is far from clear that reasonable citizens want, or would want, their gov-
ernment to respond to their uninformed demands.
Id. at 1074. Nina Mendelson points to an interesting example of an agency doing as Sunstein
recommends, while also seeking to educate the public. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration conducted a rulemaking regarding whether to allow automobile dealers to retrofit
cars with on-off switches for airbags. See Mendelson, supra note 123, at 1366 (discussing Air
Bag On-Off Switches, DOT & NHTSA, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406 (Nov. 21, 1997)). Almost all the
600 comments from members of the public supported airbag deactivation. See id. The agency
concluded, however, that these strong views reflected a misunderstanding of the actual risks and
benefits of airbags. After convening focus groups that suggested that public education would
reduce public misconceptions, the agency issued a rule that prohibited on-off switches except in
limited circumstances and also required any car owner seeking deactivation to read an informa-
tion brochure. See id.
142 A brief, helpful introduction to the debate can be found in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW 140–45 (2011).
143 Mendelson, supra note 123, at 1371–72.
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little harder to affirmatively state what agency officials should do. It does not mean
keeping a tally; Mendelson joins the it’s-not-a-vote chorus.144 Officials must “attend to”
and “respond” to such comments, not “bury” them.145 Such comments “deserve especial
attention” if they are numerous, one-sided, raise an issue that is relevant under the stat-
ute, are coherent and persuasive, and point in a different direction than that considered
by the agency.146 The agency must “pay attention” to such comments.147 “They should
prompt agency officials at least to think twice—and perhaps to consider and investigate
public views more systematically.”148 What all of this suggests is that such comments
are never in themselves a reason to do something. Rather, the comments are a prompt;
they flag an issue that the agency should focus on, but the agency should then deter-
mine whether the more accepted bases of agency decisionmaking justify a particu-
lar outcome.
In three ways, Mendelson implicitly acknowledges the difficulty of pinning down
what it would mean for the agency to do what she is suggesting. First, she states that
this requirement could not be judicially enforceable; it is just not possible for a court to
determine that the agency gave adequate weight to value-laden comments.149 That sug-
gests that she herself cannot quite articulate what the agency is supposed to do. Second,
she suggests that a strong set of value-laden comments might trigger not a substantive
consideration but additional procedures: targeted opinion polling, focus groups, civil
juries, and/or referral to the White House.150 (She is not clear on whether these are in
144 Id. at 1370, 1374.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1375.
147 Id. at 1378.
148 Nina A. Mendelson, Should Mass Comments Count?, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 173,
177 (2012).
149 Mendelson, supra note 123, at 1378–79. Accordingly, she writes, “judicial review under
the APA on these matters ought to be limited to requiring agencies to give some acknowledgment
of significant views expressed through lay comments, and courts then should defer to the content
of any subsequent response from the agency.” Id. at 1379.
150 To her list might be added one other standard lawyer’s move: shifting the burden of per-
suasion. Consider again the public comments in the FCC’s media ownership rulemaking. See
supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. These met all the criteria Mendelson identifies
for meriting “especial attention”: a huge number of comments, essentially unanimous, urging the
FCC to stand by its existing and clearly valid approach, contrary to the Commission’s desire to
change course. One of the dissenting Commissioners argued that while this outpouring did not
bind the Commission, it did shift the burden of proof:
[T]he public apparently has no interest in further media consolidation. Is
the majority that confident that it is serving the interests of the nearly two
million citizens who are motivated enough to contact the Commission or
attend field hearings to oppose further concentration? I would not assume
that those people who took time to alert us to their concerns, more than
99.9 percent in opposition, are wrong unless overwhelming evidence and
reasoned analysis proves it.
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addition to or instead of direct agency consideration.) Third, she suggests that agencies
themselves should establish written standards under which they “commit to weigh lay-
person comments in a particular way,”151 but she does not suggest what way or ways
would be appropriate.
All of which leaves me sharing Mendelson’s instincts but unsure as to what actually
to do about it. If all that comments communicate is a point of view, a bottom line—I
am for; I am against—then how can an agency pay attention to them other than by treat-
ing the process as a kind of vote? The process itself implicitly instructs the agency to
do what Mendelson says to do, somehow to take the comments into account. But if the
only way not to ignore them—the only thing that can be done with them—is to tally
them, then that is what will happen.
Finally, there is reason to be concerned about the incentives and potential for ma-
nipulation that agencies’ approach to expressions of “views” creates. If agencies give
weight to value-based comments, more of them will arrive. It is likely that forces on
both sides of an issue will mobilize, leading to a stalemate. When comments on a tech-
nical question (Is benzene a carcinogen?152 What is the global warming potential of
methane?153) are divided, the agency can make a reasoned determination between the
positions: it can do the best it can to determine which is right. But when comments on
a question of values are divided, there is no principled basis on which the agency can
choose between them. It could, of course, opt for the views most aligned with those of
the president. But if that is all it is doing, then the public comments have essentially
been denied any weight at all. Furthermore, such a standoff might occur even if overall
popular sentiment is quite unevenly divided; those for whom an issue is most salient
will produce comments far in excess of their proportion in the population.154
D. Review and Legitimation
Having disaggregated the § 553(c) trio, I would like to conclude by considering the
package as a whole. Why these, and only these?
Administrative law has always required a theory to explain how and why unelected
bureaucrats can exercise discretion. That is why the nondelegation doctrine never goes
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—
Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules, 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620, 13,978
(2003) (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting).
151 Mendelson, supra note 123, at 1379.
152 See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
153 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF GREENHOUSE GASES:
METHANE EMISSIONS (2013).
154 These features are characteristic of the legislative process, and one might therefore assume
they are appropriate for the agency counterpart to congressional action. That argument is beyond
the scope of this Article, but I would at least say that (a) the traditional understanding is that
agencies are doing something different than legislatures and (b) in the legislative setting too they
may be bugs rather than features.
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away as a theoretical matter, even though in practice it has been pretty much the judi-
cial equivalent of the Loch Ness Monster or the Yeti—the subject of endless attention
but never actually sighted.155 Almost all models of the administrative state take into
account—indeed, are developed in response to—the democratic concerns of unelected
officials wielding discretionary authority.
Richard Stewart’s 1975 article, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
offered the definitive account of shifting models of legitimacy until that time, tracing
the decline of the “transmission belt” theory, according to which agencies are mechani-
cal implementers of legislative decisions, the move to a focus on technocratic expertise,
and the subsequent rise of an interest representation model.156 These remain, in essence,
the three basic theories.157 The first reflects rule-of-law aspirations and assumes that
agencies are meaningfully bound by and simply implementing decisions made by
elected, and thus more legitimate, actors.158 The second reflects technocratic aspirations
and assumes that there are right answers to policy questions and that agencies know
what they are doing.159 The third reflects democratic aspirations and assumes that the
administrative process can replicate or even improve on the larger electoral and political
process, with direct or indirect participation by affected interests in some sort of either
Madisonian republican or preference aggregating process.160
I have focused on another cluster of three, so the reader can guess what is coming
next. The three models correspond (though concededly loosely) to the three types of
notice-and-comment submissions. In reverse order, the democratic model involves con-
sideration of public views; the technocratic model involves consideration of data; the
formal model requires submissions of (legal) arguments. The third of these is the
poorest fit, because “arguments” might include other than legal arguments and because
factual information is equally important under that model. Still, there is some corre-
spondence. The point is not that one or the other is therefore correct. Rather, the point
is that we look in particular places to justify agency action, and we end up looking in
the same places whether we are concocting grand theory or whether we are determining
what particular inputs would be useful to agencies. All three types of input are relevant.
And any of the three theories would suffice (though only if, or to the extent that, they
have a basis in fact).
A similar overlap exists with the § 553(c) trio and principles of judicial review. To
oversimplify: Courts can set aside agency action because it is unsupported by the facts,
155 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722–23 (2002).
156 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669 (1975).
157 A useful overview is David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611 (2012).
158 See id. at 613–14.
159 See id. at 616–17.
160 See id. at 620–21.
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because it is counter to law, and because it is poorly reasoned and just does not make
sense.161 Here again there is a loose but real correspondence to § 553(c). Data submitted
through public comment may show that the agency’s decision has or lacks a basis in
fact; argument may show that it satisfies or violates legal constraints; views may indi-
cate that it is not arbitrary and capricious.
CONCLUSION
In subtitling this Article “a rumination,” I sought to excuse myself from the need
to conclude with a firm normative takeaway. Instead, I will return one last time to the
honeybees. Life as a honeybee has its drawbacks. Bees are, of course, very, very busy.
During the summer, they pretty much work themselves to death, expiring in a matter
of weeks. But though their life is short, it is neither nasty nor brutish. To the contrary,
it has its moments of transcendence, as when the swarm reaches its unanimous, and al-
most invariably correct, decision about where to build a new hive. Here the bees man-
age to solve collective action problems that bedevil human beings in many settings,
including notice-and-comment rulemaking. If humans, like bees, had congruent inter-
ests and shared preferences, so the only challenge was gathering information, the
rulemaking process would be a good deal more straightforward. But we do not, and the
APA’s drafters knew it, requiring agencies to permit persons to participate through
submission not only of data, but also of arguments and views.
161 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). I set to one side the question of procedural errors. Id. § 706(2)(D).
